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14AIVER OF TRIAL BY JU.RY
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
IN CRIMINAL CASES
T HE right of trial by jury, long considered a fundamental right,
evolved out of the common law as a part of the movement
which over a period of many years relieved the English people of
the evils of arbitrary justice that had developed during the period
of the absolute monarchy. The time had been in English legal
history when the accused in a criminal prosecution was denied the
benefit of counsel and the right to testify in his own behalf; it was
during this period that trial by jury, which had earlier been con-
sidered as a privilege only, came to be considered as a necessity
-in order to establish between the accused and the state a buffer
which would be effective to insure a more just result in criminal
prosecutions. Since many of the circumstances which fostered the
development of the jury as a device for protection against the
Crown have now largely disappeared, it seems not improper to
inquire whether present conditions justify continued unbending
adherence to this historic attitude toward a defense erected during
an earlier period in resistance to tyrannical methods in the admin-
istration of criminal justice, especially if it is found that non-
waivability of jury trial disserves rather than fosters the ends of
justice.
I
As population increased and social organizations became more
complex with a resulting increase in the crime rate, it became more
and more difficult for the criminal courts to keep abreast of their
dockets. As soon as it became understood that the administration
of criminal justice, under these changed conditions, was greatly
impeded by the cumbersome jury trial, England began to experi-
ment as early as 1847 with a statute which permitted waiver of
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the jury in certain juvenile cases.1 This statute met with such suc-
cess that other legislation continued to be passed from time to
time extending the right to waive trial by jury to other types of
criminal cases, until in 1925 the present Criminal Justice Act was
passed permitting waiver of trial by jury in all classes of criminal
cases and providing further that some types of criminal actions
should be triable only by the court. As a result of the increase in
summary jurisdiction and the extension of waiver of trial by jury
thus provided for, in the year immediately following the passage
of the Act approximately 90 per cent of the defendants charged
with indictable offenses were dealt with in summary courts or
waived trial by jury, only the remainder being tried by jury.' A
considerable saving of time and consequently of expense in the
criminal courts of England was effected by this legislation, and it
has been generally recognized that the administration of criminal
justice was thus made more rapid and more efficient.
Such experimentation with waiver of jury trial was not con-
fined to England. For now more than two hundred years, waiver
has been permitted in some form in the courts of Maryland.' Even
after Maryland became a state and ratified the United States Con-
stitution, the earlier practice was continued, with a legislative
pronouncement of the procedure following in 1809. The reason
given for the enactment of the latter measure, as stated in the bill,
was "the great saving of time and expense." This statute provided
that courts of criminal jurisdiction should "determine on the
whole merits of the case, which may be to said courts respectively
submitted."' The present Maryland statute, which has been con-
strued to extend to both felony and misdemeanor cases, and even
to capital cases, reads: "Any person presented or indicted may
IJuvenile Offenders Act, 1847, 10 and 11 VIcT., c. 82.
2 Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 and 16 Gzo. V, c. 86.
' HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENCLAND (1931) 310, 311.
' See Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Case by Judges Alone, With.
out Juries (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 699.
5 Maryland Acts of 1809, c. 144.
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instead of traversing the same before a jury, traverse the same
before the court, who shall thereupon try the law and the facts."'
Under this statute, 30,107 cases were disposed of by the Criminal
Court of Baltimore during a recent six-year period. Of these,
1,237 cases were tried before juries and 25,940 by the Court.
Included in the 25,940 court trial cases were 13,294 pleas of
guilty and 12,646 contested cases. In terms of percentage, only
4.10 per cent of all cases disposed of were tried before juries. Of
the contested cases, 91.09 per cent were tried by the Court, only
8.91 per cent being tried by juries. Thus more than 90 per cent of
the defendants who protested their innocence chose to be tried by
the court rather than by the jury.
The waiver of trial by jury has also long been used in Connecti-
cut as a means of increasing the efficiency of the administration
of criminal justice. A statute providing for the practice, enacted in
1874, was repealed in 1878 but was promptly re-enacted. The
Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Worden,' decided in 1878,
upheld the validity of such a statute as coming clearly within the
constitutional provisions relating to trial by jury. It is to be noted
that the constitutional provisions under which this case was de-
cided are almost identical with the provisions of the Texas Consti-
tution. The present statute in Connecticut provides that in all
criminal cases the accused may elect to be tried by the court, with
the sole qualification that in capital cases the court shall consist
of three judges instead of one."
That this practice has been continued to the present in Maryland
and Connecticut may be taken as some evidence that it has worked
with measurable success and to the satisfaction of the public con-
cerned. While some states have thus passed statutes permitting
(;, MD. CODE: ANN. (Flack, 1930) art. 75, § 109.
7 Frank, Trying Criminal Cases Without Juries in Maryland (1930) 17 VA. L. REV.
253. The period for which statistics are given was 1924 to 1930.
8 46 Conn. 349 (1878).
r r.x. CONST. (1876) Art. I, § 15; CONN. CONST. (1818) Art. 1, § 21.
10GEN. STAT. OF CONN. (1930) § 6477.
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waiver of trial by jury in all cases, others have limited the right
of waiver to prosecutions for misdemeanors and felonies below
the grade of a capital offense; still others have limited the right
to misdemeanors alone. In some states, by judicial decision, waiver
in felony cases has been permitted. In the appendix which follows
this note, an attempt has been made to classify the several Ameri-
can jurisdictions according to the type of statutory or judicial rule
in force.'
lI
In the past some doubt has been expressed as to the constitu-
tionality of a criminal trial without a jury in felony cases.'" Article
III, .\ 2 of the United States Constittition provides that "The trial of
all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury. .. "
The Sixth Amendment provides that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed.... ." These provisions would seem to be
mandatory in nature and for many years were so construed by the
federal courts.'' However, the case of Patton v. United States,'"
decided in 1930, took the opposite view and dispelled any doubt
that had previously existed. In that case the defendant was under
indictment for the penitentiary offense of conspiring to bribe a
prohibition agent. When during the trial one juror was unable to
continue on the panel because of severe illness, the defendant and
his counsel agreed in open court, after a statement by the court
that both sides were entitled to a jury of twelve men, that the trial
should proceed with the remaining eleven jurors. The prosecutor
consented and the trial proceeded with the result that the defendant
was convicted and sentenced to a prison term. Defendant then ap-
IL See Appendix, p. 53 infra.
12 Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909).
13 Coates v. United States, 290 Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923) ; Blair v. United States.
241 Fed. 217 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917) ; Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 1st, 1909).
14281 U. S. 276 (1930).
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pealed to the circuit court of appeals, claiming that as a matter of
law his constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve men could
not be waived. Upon certification of the question thus presented,
the Supreme Court, in an opinion affirming the conviction, took the
view that there is no difference in substance between consent to
be tried by fewer than twelve jurors and a waiver of a jury alto-
gether, since a consent to proceed without one juror is indis-
tinguishable from a consent to proceed without two, without three,
or without twelve."5 Then the Court, dealing with the problem as
though it were a question of complete waiver of a jury, held that
the Constitution conferred a right of jury trial upon the accused
which he could forego at his election. This right of waiver, it was
held, extended to all types of criminal cases and was recently re-
affirmed by the Supreme Court.' This interpretation of the con-
stitutional provision for trial by jury has become the basis for Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides
that trial by jury may be waived by a defendant in any case re-
quired to be tried by a jury, with the approval of the court and the
consent of the government.'7 Thus it seems well settled that under
the United States Constitution trial by jury is a right which may
be waived by the defendant with the consent of the prosecution.
The Texas Constitution provides that the "right of trial by jury
shall remain inviolate" and empowers the legislature to regulate
and maintain such right." Inasmuch as this wording would seem
'-- The basis for this conclusion was that the common-law jury was composed of
twelve men and the Constitution has long been considered as establishing the right of
trial by jury as it existed at common law at the time of its adoption. Id. at 289.
16 See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942).
17 Fsn. RULFS CRlM. Pnoc. (1946) Rule 23, provides: "(a) Trial by Jury. Cases
required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in
writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the government. (b) Jury of
Less Than Twelve. Juries shall be of twelve, but at any time before verdict, the parties
may stipulate in writing with the approval of the court that the jury shall consist of any
number less than twelve. (c) Trial Without Jury. In a case tried without a jury, the
court shall make a general finding and shall in addition on request find the facts spe-
cifically."
Is TEx. CONST. (1876) Art. 1, § 15.
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to have no greater scope than the comprehensive language of the
United States Constitution interpreted in the Patton case, it seems
clear that the Texas Legislature, without impairing any privilege
or right accorded the people by the Texas Constitution, could enact
a statute permitting waiver of trial by jury in all cases with the
consent of the prosecution. The existing Texas statutes relating to
the matter provide that the accused in a criminal case may waive
any right secured to him by law, except the right of trial by jury
in a felony case in which he enters a plea of not guilty.1" Another
provision permits the accused, with the consent of the prosecutor
and the approval of the court, to waive trial by jury in all cases
not punishable by death in which the defendant pleads guilty.2"
Thus, trial by jury cannot be waived at present in capital cases
and contested felony cases, and a defendant in either sort of
prosecution who denies that he is-guilty of the felony of which he
is accused cannot avoid a jury trial however much to his prejudice
it may be.
III
Although the average citizen regards the institution of the jury
trial as one of the bulwarks of freedom, it is now generally be-
lieved, in the light of experience in the jurisdictions permitting
waiver, that this reverence is not so widely shared by those, who
are facing the prospect of conviction as has been supposed. If the
right to jury trial is intended as a protection to the defendant, then
it seems absurd to require that the accused take advantage of his
"right" even though it may have become of dubious advantage to
him. If the accused is a member of a minority group within the
community, he may well expect greater justice at the hands of a
deliberate judge than in the verdict of an impassioned jury. The
crime of which he is accused may be of such a nature that the
19 Te.x. CODE CRIM. Paoc. (1925) art. 11 (as amended by Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p.
65, c. 43, § 2).
20 Tax. CODE CRIM. PRoc. (1925) art. 10a (as amended by Acts 1931, 42nd Leg., p.
65, c. 43, § 2).
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chance of a dispassionate verdict from a jury drawn from an
aroused community is slight; again, of the defendant's criminal
record is especially uninspiring, he might reasonably prefer to be
tried by the jurge. And in other cases the personality and disposi-
tion of the judge or some small advantage in strategy which would
inure from a trial by the court might evoke a decision to take the
case from the jury. If in such cases society insists upon a trial by
jury, this fundamental of justice may be converted in certain in-
stances into an instrument of injustice.2 '1 Less insignificant but
nevertheless to be weighed is the further consideration that an
immense amount of time and money is expended on seemingly
needless jury trials which could be saved without forfeiting any
of the protection available to the defendant in any case in which
it may be desired.
One of the principal grounds of objection to statutes permitting
waiver of a trial by jury has been, in effect, that society should
protect the accused against the danger involved in placing in the
hands of one person the trial of a cause upon which his life may
depend. This objection has not been found compelling in Mary.
land, where for years it has been the practice to try even capital
cases before a single judge.'2 However, other jurisdictions have
felt that a waiver of trial by jury in capital cases should necessi-
tate the hearing of the case by three judges;23 and some jurisdic-
tions have refused to permit waiver of jury at all in capital cases.
Another objection which has been urged against waiver of trial
by jury is that such a waiver defeats the jurisdiction of the court,
anargument based upon the common-law view that the jury is an
integral part of the court without which judicial business cannot
21 See Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases (1927) 25 MIcH. L
REv. 695.
22 The present Maryland statute (MD. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 75, § 109) permits
removal of the cause upon filing of an alidavit by defendant that he believes the court
is prejudiced.
28 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1930) § 266, nn.
1,2.
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be transacted." The proponents of this view contend that waiver
is not a personal right of the accused and cannot be allowed since
an individual may not waiver the jurisdiction of the court. How-
ever, the Patton case has put this controversy at rest by holding
that the right does not go to the jurisdiction of the court but is a
personal right or privilege which may be waived by the accused
in a criminal case. This view has been followed in many state
decisions." *
A problem related to that of waiver of the entire jury arises
when, as in the Patton case, a juror is unable to continue with the
trial. Whether the defendant should be permitted to waiver the
presence of the missing juror and consent to trial by the remaining
eleven. The problem raised by the waiver of .one juror is hardly
distinguishable from the problem raised by the waiver of twelve,
yet when the court, the prosecutor and the defendant are all will-
ing to proceed with the trial with fewer than twelve jurors, it is a
waste of the taxpayer's money and the jury's time to prolong the
defendant's jeopardy by requiring a new trial and a new jury.
This is the view adopted by the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, and it might well be adopted in this state.
The position that the jury trial is a right that should not be
waivable is without basis in either the Constitution of Texas or,
in the light of the Patton case, in the Constitution of the United
States. It seems clear that jury trial is not a constitutional neces-
sity but a right reserved by those instruments to the defendant in
a criminal action. The understandable reluctance of judges to
assume the responsibility of condemning a man to death or to
imprisonment offers the only cogent reason why a mutual desire
of the prosecution and defense that the jury should be dispensed
with should not be granted. As soon as the judges express a willing-
ness to undertake such responsibility, it may be expected that the
economies in time and money which should followupon the adop-
24 Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128 (1858) ; see Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 767; Note
(1929) 58 A. L. R. 1031; Oppenheini, loc. cit. su pra note 21.
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tion of a statute permitting waiver of jury in all cases will entitle
the proposal to more serious consideration in Texas than it has
received in the past.
William B. Handley, Jr.
APPENDIX: PnoVISIONS RLLATING TO WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
The following states have statutory provisions ailowing waiver of trial by jury in
both felony and misdemeanor cases:
California, CAL. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1941) § 1435.
Illinois, ILL. REv. STAT. (1945) c. 38, § 736.
Indiana, IND. STAT. (Burns, 19331 § 9-1803.
Maryland, MD. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 75, § 109.
Michigan, Micit. Cohie. LAWS (19291 § 17131.
Minnesota, MINN. STAT. (1945) § 631.01.
North Dakota, N. D. REV. CODE (1943) § 29.1602.
Rhode Island, R. 1. GEN. LAWS (19381 e. 626, § 71.
Wisconsin, Wts. STAT. (1941) § 357.01.
The following states have statutory provisions allowing. waiver of trial by jury in both
felony and misdemeanor cases, but provide for three judges in a capital case:
Connecticut, CONN. GE.N. STAT. (1930) I 6477.
Ohio, Omo CODE (Baldwin, 1940) §§ 13442-4, 13442-5.
The following states have statutory provisions allowing waiver of trial by jury in both
felony and misdemeanor cases, except capital cases:
Arkansas, AIIK. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 3912.
Florida, FLA. STAT. (1941) § 912.01.
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 263 § 6.
New Jersey, N. J. REv. STAT. 11937) § 2:12.2, 2:13.1, 2:191-1.
Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) § 19-786.
Utah, UTAH CODE (1943) § 105-28-2.
The following states have constitutional provisions which have been construed to
allow waiver of trial by jury in felony and misdemeanor cases:
New Hampshire, NEW HAMP. CONST. (1793) ART. 16, except capital cases; see
State v. Almy, 67 N. H. 274, 280 (1892).
Oklahoma, OKLA. CONST. (1907) Ant. VII, § 20; waiver in misdemeanors, see
Wise v. State, 280 Okl. Cr. Rep. 324, 230 Pac. 930 (1924) ; waiver in
felonies, see Ex Parte King, 42 Okla. Cr. Rep. 46, 274 Pac. 682 (1929).
Oregon, ORE. CONST. (1859) ART. I, § 11.
The following state has statutory provisions allowing waiver of trial by jury except
where the offense is punishable by death or imprisonment at hard labor:
Louisiana, LA. CODE OF CraM. PRo. (Dart, 1943) art. 342.
The following states have statutory provisions allowing waiver of trial by jury in
felony cases on a plea of guilty:
Colorado, COLO. STAT. (1935) c. 48, § 32.
Delaware, DEL. CODE (1935) § 4315, except capital cases.
Montana, MONT. REv. CODE (1935) § 11611, 11929.
New Mexico, N. M. STAT. (1941) § 42-1108. But see State v. Hernandez, 46 N. M.
134, 123 P. (2d) 387. (1942).
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South Dakota, S. D. CODE (1939) §§ 34-2903, 34-3108, 34-3301, 34-3403.
Virginia, VA. CODE (1942) §§ 4900, 4927.
Washington, WASH. REV. STAT. (Rem., 1931) § 2309.
The following state has a statutory provision allowing waiver of trial by jury only in
misdemeanor cases, but by judicial decision the constitutional right of trial by jury has
been held not to be denied when on a plea of guilty in a murder case, the accused was
not afforded the right of trial by jury:
Nevada, NEV. COMP. LAWS (Hillyer, 1929) § 10919, § 10920; see State v. Ceja, 53
Nev. 272, 298 Pac. 658 (1931).
The following states have statutory provisions and/or judicial decisions and constitu-
tional provisions allowing waiver of trial by jury in misdemeanor cases only:
Arizona, ARiz. CODE (1939) § 44-1802, § 44-1807.
Alabama, ALA. CODE (1940) tit. 15, § 32.
Georgia, GA. CODE (1933) § 102-106, Moore v. State, 124 Ga. 30,52 S. E. 81 (1905).
Idaho, IDAHO CODE (1932) § 19-1802.
Iowa, IOWA CODE (1946) § 762.12.
Kansas, GEN. STAT. OF KAN. (Corrick, 1935) § 62-1401.
Kentucky, Ky. REv. STAT. (1943) § 26.400.
Maine, REV. STAT. (1944) c. 94, § 17.
Mississippi, MIsS. CODE (1942) § 1836, § 1839.
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. (1943) § 29-603.
New York, N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. (McKinney, 1930) § 702.
North Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) § 15-157.
South Carolina, S. C. CODE (1942) § 931, § 952, § 971.
Tennessee, TENN. CODE (Williams, 1934) § 11493.
Vermont, CONST. OF VT. (1924) ART. 10.
West Virginia, W. VA. CoDE (1931) c. 56, art. 6, § 11.
Wyoming, Wyo. REV. STAT. (1931) § 33-121.
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